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In the Supre1ne Court of the 
State of Utah 
F'IRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N. A., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EDWARD H. BATES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 9926 
The question in this case is whether Willis Bates, dur-
ing his lifetime made an unconditional and irrevocable gift 
of his home in Payson, Utah, to his brother, Edward H. 
Bates, the defendant herein, sometimes referred to in the 
testimony as Ted. The evidence is not in dispute. Plain-
tiff introduced the only evidence. 
On J·anuary 14, 1949, Willis Bates, Edward H. Bates 
and Thelma Vest, hereinafter refeiTed to as the custodian, 
all resided in Payson, Utah. Defendant married and two 
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children were born as issue of that marriage. In Septem-
ber o[ 1956, his first wife died (Tr. 112). In 1960, he re-
married and was divorced three months later (Tr. 112). 
Willis Bates is nOIW deceased, ;having died on or about the 
21st day of January, 1962 (Tr. 113-114). Thelma Vest 
SmurtJhwaite was at the time a Notary Public and reference 
to her will at times be as custodian. 
On January 14, 1949, Willis Bates went to the home 
of the custodian and requested her to make a deed, a ·bill 
of sale and power olf attorney (Tr. 61-62) .. Plaintiff's at-
torney asked the custodian the following question: "Tell 
us the circumstances surrounding the preparation of tllls 
deed" (Tr. 61). Eliminating most o.f the "he said" and 
"I said" from the custodian's testimony, we quorte from her · 
testimony as to what Willis Bates said and what the cus-
todian said to him on that occasion. 
Willis Bates said, "I 'have received a telephone call 
from California offering me employment. I am leaving 
irnmediaJtely. If anything happens to me I would want my 
brother, Ted, to have the ·home (Tr. 61-62). Could you 
help me make the deed in fue event that if .anything hap-
pened to me that Ted -could have my home? I have done 
much for Lewis who is principal of the High School. I edu-
cated Walter. I have never done much for Ted and he is 
the baby of the family. I've always felt compassionate 
toward Ted and I have always felt that I would like to do 
more fo~ hl.m if ever I was in a position to do so. He is 
married and has 1had kind of a rough time so if you will 
help me with this I would appreciate it. And if you would 
hold this for me, I would appreciate that too. In the event 
that anything happens to me you give it to Ted, but I 
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don't want Ted to know that you have this document un-
less something happens to me. That is just our secret." 
The custodian said, ''Willis I will be glad to help you-
that is ~how I happened to help him at this time." 
The attorney for the plaintiff also propounded the 
following questions to the custodian: (Tr. 66) 
Question: ''The terms of the trust of the things you 
were ·holding was to deliver them to Ted in case something 
happened to Mr. Bates." 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "You lmow if it was in the case of his 
death?" 
Answer: "In the case of death. He did not want 
Ted to know that he had a deed to him unless he passed 
away. He wanted Ted to ·have the deed and the home in 
the event something 'happened.'' 
The custodian continued in continuous possession of 
the deed from January 14, 1949, until the death of Willis 
Bates in January, 1962, exeept on two occasions when the 
escrow holder was leaving foc California ·and on each of 
these occasions she went to Willis Bates and told him she 
was going away and that she did not want to take the deed 
with ·her, that perhaps if she left it, it might be destroyed 
and requested Willis Bates to hold tile deed until her return 
and on each occasion upon her return to Payson, Willis 
Bates returned the deed to her (Tr. 63-64). 
When the defendant re-married in 1960, Willis Bates 
came to the custodian and stated: (Tr. 67-68) "I am quite 
concerned over this marriage of Ted's. You know I've 
thought about the deed. I want Ted and those children 
to have the home. I would not want that woman or any 
of her kin or her family to have one sand of one brick of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
any part of that place. It is for Ted and those motherless 
children." I said, 'Willis, You know, if you feel that way, 
I think it might be a good idea for you to go around the 
corner and have Mr. HOdgson . . . . the attorney . . . . 
draw you up a letter as to what you would like dooe.' He 
said, "Well, I have been awful upset over this. If anything· 
happens to me I would want Ted to record the deed and 
then I would want the children rto have the home.' . . . 
He didn't ask for his papers. I still kept the papers that 
he had left with me. One day I saw him and he said, 'I 
feel better. Ted is getting a divorce from the woman . . . . 
We will leave things like they are, I feel relieved. Will you 
please continue to take care of the things and just let it go 
as it is?' I said, 'I still think, Willis, you ought to see an 
attorney. Sin-ce you drew that up, you have had a lot of 
other things in yomt possession, you have other things.' 
He said, 'We will take care of that later on', and he went 
on about his business.'' 
Two or three days before Willis Bates' death, in Jan-
uary, 1962, he requested the custodian to come and see him 
at the Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake City and the cus-
todian testified that on this occasion the donor said: "You 
know ·horw I feel aJbourt my home . . . . I want Ted to re-
cord the deed when I am gone. I want you to deliver the 
deed to Ted and I want Ted, if ·he has not severed his re-
lationship with this woman, I want you to have Ted make 
a deed to those motherless children. The :home is for Ted 
and his kids" (Tr. 68). Willis Bates further told the cus-
todian: "I would like Ted to record the deed and make a 
deed to Rose Mary and Joe, Ted's motherless children . . . ._ 
Upon my death my home will be Ted's and I want you to 
give the deed to Ted and take care of it" (Tr. 70). 
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The ~~odian further testified as follows: "He left 
the deed with me in 1949 in my safe keeping and in my 
care and custody and he knew that I would follow out his 
wishes" err. 71. "In his heart, ·he wanted Ted to ·have 
that place. He never, ever, ever mentioned anything about 
his other lots, his car or his personal property or anything 
other than in the beginning there" (Tr. 72). 
Custodian furtheT testified ·concerning her visit with 
the decedent at the hospital: 
Question (;by attorney for plaintiff): "And did you 
have a conversation with him concerning what he ·wanted 
done with this deed, or what he wanted done with this 
property in the event Mr. Bates' marriage to his wife was 
still valid?" 
Answer (by custodian) : "He again reiterated the fact 
that ·he wanted this deed delivered to his brother, Ted. And 
for Ted and his children to benefit from this home and 
this deed. That was his greatest wish and desire." 
She furrther testified that if Willis Bates 1had asked for 
a return of the deed she would have returned it to him (Tr. 
75). 
She also said th•at Willis Bates always told ~her to de-
liver the deed to Ted and have it taken care of which she 
said meant to record it (Tr. 76). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE BURDEN OF PROVING NO~N-DELIVERY OF 
THE DEED WAS UPON THE PLAINTIFF. 
In Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355, 
this Court said: 
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''~he possession of a deed, fully executed, in the hands 
of the grantee, is prima facie, but not conclusive, evi-
dence of its delivocy. It, therefore, follows that ~he who 
disputes this presumption has the burden of proof, 
and must show that there has been no delivery. And 
not only must this presumption be overcome, but it is 
held that there is such a strong implication that it has 
been delivered when it is found in the hands of the 
grantee that only strong evidence can rebut the pre-
sumption. 
"And not only is the burden orf proving non-delivery 
upon the plaintiffs, but the inference of delivery arising 
from possession of the deed by the grantee and from 
the recording thereof is entitled to great and control-
ling weight and can only be o~ercome by clear and 
convincing evidence. (Citing cases)." 
POINT ll 
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUSTAIN THE BUR-
DEN OF PROO·F AND THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THJE FINDTNGS OF FACT OR THE CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The Court failed to make any findings as to the rea-
son which prompted the donor to make and execute the 
deed. The Court also failed to quote the words of the don-
or when he delivered the deed to the custodian. 
The Court refused to make a finding that the donor 
said nothing to the escrow holder about repossessing the 
deed or changing it, although requested to do so, (R. 33) 
and this was error. Giauque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 
89, 129 Pac. 429. 
It is evident that the Court's decision was based upon 
the following findings: 
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( 1) The Cotu1: found that the grantor occupied the 
premises and paid the taxes and expenses thereon from 
the date the deed was made until his death. 
(2) That the donor, at the instance and request of 
the custodian, had possession of the deed on two occasions 
for short intervals. 
3) That because the grantor, eleven years after Jan-
uary 14, 1949, when the deed was delivered to the cus-
todian, said to the custodian that he did not want the don-
or's wife to have any part of the home. 
( 4) That thirteen years after the delivery of the 
deed the donor told the custodian that if the donee had 
not severed 'his relations with the second wife, he wanted 
the donee to record the deed and requested the custodian 
to have the donee make a deed to the children. 
We treat the questions raised in the order started: 
(1) In Lossee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P 2d 132, 
this Court held that the deeds were delivered where, after 
the deeds were executed, the grantor rented the property 
to some of the grantees. 
In the case of Burnham, et al. v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 
208 P. 2d 96, the deeds were made on December 20, 1938. 
The whereabouts of the deeds was undisclosed until March, 
1946. \vhen they we-re delivered to the grantee's husband 
with instructions that the deeds not be given to the gran-
tee until after the grantor's death, because she "didn't want 
the grantee to feel any personal obligation to her while she 
\Vas still living." The grantor continued to pay the taxes 
and other ex~penses on the property until her death on 
March 30; 1947. This Court held there was a good delivery. 
(2) In Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177 
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Pac. 763, this Court held the deed was delivered where the 
facts showed that the grantor had repossessed the deeds 
and tore them up, made a deed to an uncle off the gran-
tees, and the grantor had consented that the property 
deeded by him to his children be traded for other property. 
See also Johnson v. Cooper, 255 P 1112, Kan. The deed 
was made in aJbout 1915 or 1916 ·and delivered at that time 
to one Gardner, cashier of a bank. The deed remained in 
the bank until after March, 1920, when the grantor took 
the deed into his possession and destroyed it. The Court 
held that the deed had been delivered. This case will be 
referred to hereinafter in more detail. 
(3) In the Johnson v. Cooper case, supra, we quote 
from the Court's opinion: "Lethia Hayes, now Lethia John-
son, the plaintiff, went to live with Kesler and his wife and 
remained there until she married, a period of about three 
years. During the first year she received some wages. 
Thereafter she simply made her home with the Keslers, 
kept house and looked after Mrs. Kesler, who was an in-
valid. On October 20, 1915, she married. Mrs. Kesler died 
December 15, 1915. Shortly after the death of Mrs. Kes-
ler, the deed was executed and delivered to Gardner, the 
cashier of the local hank. The reasons given by Kesler for 
making the deed was that the gmntee had nursed his wife 
and he felt she had earned it. 
Gardner testified that the deed was left with him for 
safe keeping and for delivery after Kesler's death and that 
Kesler said: "If anthing happens to me, at my death, I 
want you to give this to Miss Lethia Hayes.'' Gardner 
testified that Kesler said: "He wanted it laid away so that 
when he died the property would go to Lethia Hayes. It 
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is to be put away and when I am gone, she can have it and 
have it recorded." 
The deed remained in the bank until after March 20, 
1920, when Kesler took the deed from the lbank and de-
stroyed it. The trial court concluded thart Kesler intended 
to constitute the banker his agent to keep the deed for him 
and to carry out a gift to take effect in.rthe future. 
The evidence was that Kesler had said that Lethia was 
cool towards him and he therefore destroyed the deed. The 
trial Court held there was no delivery. The lower court's 
judgment was reversed, the Supreme Court saying ,fuat 
there was a good delivery and that Kesler's subsequenrt 
conduct in getting the deed and destroying it had no ef-
fect on the previous completed delivery. 
In Bury v. Young, 33 Calif. 338, the Court said: "Where 
a grantor executed a deed orf his la.p.d and delivers it to an-
other 'wi·th instructions only to hold without recwding until 
his death and then deliver it to the grantee, the grantor 
cannot recall the deed or alter its provisions and he 'has no 
interest in the land except a life estate." 
On the question of whether a grantor had power to 
recall a deed delivered in escrow, evidence of subsequent 
acts are inadmissible to shorw his intentions at the time ~he 
made the deed. The Court said: "There are well considered 
cases holding that even though the grantor delivers the deed 
to the depositary reserving the right to recall it, yet if ~he 
dies without recalling and the deed is then delivered, such 
delivery is complete and entire and carries title.'' 
Quoting from ALR 52, at page 1247: "The authorities 
uniformly hold that where a g~rantor has deposited a deed 
with a third person, to be d~livered to the grantee after the 
death .of the grantor, reserving no dominion or control over 
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the same, he cannot subsequently, by withdrawing or de-
stroying the deed, or by other acts indicating a subsequent 
change of intention affect a delivery thus completed.' '(Cit-
ing a long list of cases, among which is that of Gappmayer 
v. Wilkinson~ supra .. ) 
(4) We submit ·without citing authorities that this 
finding affords no basis whatever to ·prove non;..delivery of 
the deed .. 
POINT ill 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THERE WAS A 
COav.IPLETED GIFT AN\D THE JUDG:MENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE 
CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT. 
Many·of the eases having to do with delivery of deeds 
are cited in Ameri<m1 Law of Property, Volume m, Sec-
tion 12.67, page 318. We think the law is so clearly and 
succinctly set forth in that section that we quote at length 
firom it: 
"'Delivery to Custodian or Escrow Agent. When the 
grantor deposits his deed with a custodian for delivery 
to the grantee on the happening of a certain event, usu-
ally the death of the grantor, there are in fact two 
deliveries, one to the custodian and later one to the 
grantee. It is usually held that the deed takes effect 
at the first delivery, (citing Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 
53 Utah 235, 177 Pac 763) even though the grantee 
may have had no knowedge at that time of the exis-
tence of the deed. The effect is that at date of the 
first delivery there has been transferred to the gran-
tee a fee title, subject to a tenancy in the grantor, usu-
ally a life estate, pending occurrence of the event which 
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is to terminate that interest. Accordingly the effect 
is not changed by the grantee dying prior to the gran-
tor or, by the same reasoning, prior to the happening 
of any other event on which the second delivery is con-
ditioned. The decisions, mostly of an earlier period 
than those just cited, which held that the custodian 
was agent of the grantor for the purpose of making 
delivery and ·that the deed became operative by the 
second delivery, proved to be impracticable in cases 
where prior to the second delivery the grantor died or 
became incompetent or even where he conveyed or 
mortgaged to a party with notice. Accordingly it was 
said that 'when it can make no difference, the deed 
takes effect from the second delivery; but if it does 
make a difference, then the deed takes effect from the 
first delivery.' ".Dhe final delivery appears to consum-
mate the first, or, as it is said, the finally delivery re-
lates back to the first so that the deed then takes ef-
fect as of the date of the. original deed so that death, 
insanity, or coverture of the grantor after the first 
delivery cannot vitiart:e the transfer upon happening 
of the-contingent event or upon occurrence of the sec-
ond delivery. And as to an intervening purchaser, 
mortgagee, or creditor, if he has notice from the· re-
cording of the deed or otherwise, the grantee is pro-
tected by the first delivery; with the opposite res·ult, 
of course, when there is a lack of notice. In other 
words, although the legal title may remain in a tech-
nical sense in the grantor until the condition occurs 
on which the second delivery depends, during the in-
terval the granrtee has a present right subject to a con-
dition, and on the happening of the contingency, the 
legal interest vests in the grantee as of the date of 
the first delivery. 
"However, for either delivery to be effective to 
pass title, the grantor must have surrendered all do-
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minion and C(){[ltrol over the interest to be conveyed. 
If he reseTV'es a powe~ to recall the deed, by w~d, act, 
or writing, and regardless of whether he ever exercises 
it or nort, no delivery has resulted and no transfer oc-
curs. (Oiting Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac 
63). Except as by some other act the. grantor may 
be estopped to deny delivery, this is true even though 
the mstlrument may come into the ·custody of the gran-
tee - it will still be lacking the final act required to 
put it into . effect. . But if delivered to the custodian 
with no reservation of right of rec8.n, a subsequent at-
tempt to recall the deed, or, even a repossession or 
destruction of it by the grantor, is of no effect-it is 
the intention which the grantor eocpressed to the de-
positary at the time of delivecy which is controlling 
· .. ~'Practi·cally all of the deliveries of deeds to cus-
todians considered to this point depend solely upon di-
. rections to the grantor to the custodian. Whatever 
contract exists is between these two, and often the gran-
. tee knows nothing of the matter until the second de-
livery. The event upon which the latter depends is 
··usually the death of the grantoT, sometimes coupled 
·with one of the collateral conditions just considered." 
In the Singleton v. Kelly case, supra, at the request 
of the grantor the Utah County Swveyor prepared a deed 
and handed it to the granrtoT, who then handed it to the 
grantee. The scrivner advised the grantor that to make 
the deed effective the deed had to be notarized and that 
he, the scrivner, was nort a notary. Later, the grantor and 
the . grantee went to a James H. Clark who acknowledged 
the deed. After taking the acknowledgment, Clark asked 
the_ deceased, the grantor, ""'hether 'he was turning the deed 
over to Thomas S. Kelly then or whether he expected rum 
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to have it after his death. The grantor replied: "I mean 
to keep control of it while I live." Thereupon, Mr. Clark, 
in the presence of the deceased and Thomas S. Kelly, wrote 
a letter of instructions addressed to J 1ames H. Clark and 
signed by the deceased, William E. Kelly, as follows: 
"I h~rewith deliver with this a warranty deed, made 
and executed the 16th day of May, A. D. 1914, for 
lands in Sec. 36 and 35, Township 5 South of one East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, favor of Thomas S. Kelly, and I 
hereby e~ressly instruct the said James H. Clark, or 
any one to whom these presents may come, to deliver 
the same at my death to the said ~homas S. Kelly, or 
his heirs, reserving, however, the right to withdraw 
or change same during my life.'' 
This court held that the writing was part of. the tran-
saction and the court held that there was no delivery. 
Willis S. Bates, at the time of delivering ,the deed to 
Thelma Vest, the custodian, made no reservations what-
ever concerning the deed. He merely said, "If anything 
happens to me, give it to Ted and have him record it". 
We quote from the court's decision in Wilson v. Wil-
son, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac. 643: 
"It has been determined by this Court that where a 
grantor delivers a deed to a third person, absolutely as 
his deed, without reservation, and without intending 
to reserve any control over the instrument, though it 
is not to be delivered to the grantee until the grantoq-'s 
death, the deed, when delivered is valid and takes ef-
fect from the first delivery. Also, that if after such 
delivery the deeds are repossessed by the grantor or 
destroyed, the grantor does not thereby revest him-
self with title." 
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Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, supra. Lewis B. Gappmayer 
and four other infants, by their guardian art litem, Julies 
And€'rson, and Anna la Priel GappmayeT brought this ac-
tion against the defendants Walter Wilkenson and Hattie 
Wilkenson, to have declared null and void and ill no effect 
a conveyance made by the defendant William R. Nelson of 
certain real property located in Utah County to said de-
fendants Wilkenson and that fue title to the same be re-
vested in the plaintiffs; plaintiffs also asked that the title 
to the premises conveyed by tJhe defendants Wilkenson ·to 
their c~defenda.nt Nelson, and by said Nelson conveyed 
to these plaintiffs, be restored to, and be decreed to :be the 
property of the said Walter Wilkenson and Hattie Wilken-
son. 
. :The facts in ·this case are substantially as follows: The 
mother of the plaintiffs died in 1912 and the. minors con-
tinued to live with their father for ·a!bout 2 years and the 
fat4er then decided to remarry. In order to make provi-
sion ·fo~ the minor children, he, on or about the 7-th day 
of April, 1914, deeded them the land in question and de-
posited this deed with. the Utah County Abstract Company 
to deliver to 1Jhe narned grantees upon his death. The lan<J 
was then mortgaged to Nelson, an uncle. In August, 1915, 
an a.rrangement was made between the father and the uncle 
by which it was agreed that the mortgage to Nelson should 
be paid by a conveyance of this same prorperty to Nelson. 
The deed was executed oy Gappmayer and Nelson and de-
posited ·with the same Utah County .AJbstract Company to 
deliver the deeds to the children upon t!he death of Nelson, 
subject to the right on the part of Nelson to sell part of 
the properrty to repay the indebtedness owed to him. In 
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St"ptembt-..r, 1915, Nelson was induced to record the deed he 
had received from Gappmayer and this was done with the 
approval of Gappmayer with the understanding that this 
property should be exchanged foT property in Sanpete Coun-
ty owned by the Wilkensons. This plan was carried out 
and Wilkenson conveyed the Sanpete property to Nelson 
and Nelson conveyed the Sanpete property to the plaintiffs 
and placed this deed with the Utah County A:bstract Com-
pany. 
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action, holding that 
Nelson did not intend that the deeds executed by him and 
left with the Abstract Company be a present or absolute 
conveyance. This court reversed the lower court and we 
quote from this court's decision: 
"It is apparent all through the record that it was the 
desire and intention of both the father and the uncle 
that at the death of the uncle and of the father the 
plaintiffs, the children of the deceased sisteT of Nel-
son, should have and enjoy the premises conveyed by 
them. Apparently no other consideration induced the 
arrangement to be made, and it was consummated on 
this date, to-wit, the 24th day of August, 1915, when 
this escrow agreement was finally executed and the 
papers delivered to the abstract company. It is true 
that the subsequent acts of the defendant Nelson are 
not consistent with this construction, but it is apparent 
that that was the intent of the parties at that time, 
and any act or transaction afteiWards was a subse-
quent thought. As determined hy this court in the 
case of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, the right of the plain-
tiffs became fixed by the acts of the parties at this 
date, and the defendant Nelson could not revest him-
self of any interest or title in the property, by his sub-
sequent acts." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
In rthe case of Lossee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385·, 235 P. 
2d 132, :this court held there was a delivecy where the facts 
were substantially as foilows: 
A widowed mother made deeds to each of her children 
and placed these deeds in her safety deposit box. Later she 
became ill and had one of her daughters get the deeds from 
the safety deposift box and deposit them in a drawer near 
where the mothe'r lay ill. The mother continued to rent 
the property to some of the grantees. The daughter testi-
fied that the mother could have removed the deeds from 
the bureau drawer had she wanted to; and that if the 
mother had demanded them, she would have turned the 
deeds over to her. This ·court said that the fact the deeds 
were placed by the daughter in a ·blU"eau drawer accessible 
to the mother is not determining, if they are delivered un-
conditionally and without right to recall them. The court 
further said: 
"Nor does the daughter's statement that if the mother 
had changed her mind and wanted the deeds back she 
would have given them to her necessarily affect the 
question of delivery. It is obvious in the present case 
that the daughter's conjecture as· to whether the 
mother would let ·her remove the deeds from the 
drawer during her lifetime has no weight upon the 
question of delivery, since it does nort appear that the 
mother in any \Vay qualified the delivery, nor that the 
deeds were placed in the drawer near ·her at the in-
stance of the mother. Once there had been a good de-
livery, there was nothing done or said thereafter which 
had any effect to invalidate the deeds." 
This court concluded thart the record disclosed an un-
equivocaJble and valid delivery of the deeds to the daughter. 
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Nellie, as trustee for the grantees and title was thus con-
veyed to them. 
It is not essential to a valid delivery to a third pe~rson 
that the grantee knew of the existence of the deed before 
the grantor's death. 26 CJS, !Deeds, Section 46, page 250. 
To the same effect, see Brandt v. Brandt, 260 Pac 342, and 
Neely v. Buster, 195 Pac. 736. 
See also Cell v. Drake, 100 P. 2d 949, Idaho. This is 
an action by the plaintiff to quiet title to certain land. A 
Mrs. Sandlin, while ill, called in an attorney and had him 
make a deed conveying the property to the plaintiff, Cell. 
The attorney showed the deed to the plaintiff and kept 
the deed himself and did not deliver it to Cell. The attor-
ney testified as follows: 
"Mrs. Sandlin said, 'take this deed and put it in your 
safe and keep it in your safe and at any time after my 
death that Mr. Cell asks for it, why give it to him'". 
On cross-examination, the attorney who had drawn 
the deed also testified as follows: 
"After I took it and kept it in my safe about a year 
and a half, after-in October, I think, 1933, Mrs. Sand-
lin came to my office one day and said that she wanted 
to get all of her papers, and so my stenographer went 
to the files and got this envelope out and handed to 
her all of the papers, including that deed. 
"Question: You have never seen it since? 
"An·swer: I have never seen it since." 
The Court said, and we quote: 
''The fact that the depositary returned the deed to the 
grantor on demand does not affect the legal status 
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whaJtever. He was bound by the instructions given 
him at the time the deed was deposited with him.'' 
See Jobse v. United States National Bank of POrtland, 
21 P. 2d 221, Oregon, where the ~court 'held that the deed 
had been delivered. The decedent went to the bank and 
had the cashier prepare two deeds conveying two tracts 
of land to the plaintiff, his wife, who was present at the 
time. ':Dhe casme~r prepared the deeds as directed and when 
signed the grantor signed a letter which read as foUows: 
"Gentlemen: Please deliver attached two deeds one 
to49 and 90/100 acres and one to one-half interest in 
roadway being what is known as ,fue Taughmann Place 
situate in Wilsonville, Oregon, to my wife, Mary Jobse, 
upon my dearth." 
This was all done on May 20, 1911. On September 
23, 1931, the maker of the deeds died leaving a will which 
gave rthe property described in the deeds to the defend-
ant bank in trust and provided that the net income should 
be paid· over to plaintiff during her natural life or until 
she should remarry, and that upon ~her death or remarriage 
the income should then be diwded between two of deced-
ent's nephews, the defendants in this case. The evidence 
showed . that the only instructions given by the decedent 
were those above named. After the cashier left the em-
ploy· of ·the bank, the decedent withdrew the papers from 
the bank and deposited them in another bank. This ac-
tion is by the widow to quiet title to the property. The 
court said: 
"W:herther there has been a delivery is a question of 
fact rather than of law, depending upon tlle intent of 
the grantor to vest an estate in the grantee. Hoff-
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mire v. Martin supra. It is not necessary that the 
delivery be made to the grantee personally. It may 
be made to any one acting for and in his behalf. Hence, 
it is sufficient if made to a third party or to a stran-
ger who holds it for and is to deliver it to the grantee, 
and this applies if delivered to a third party where the 
second delivery is to be postponed unrtil the death of 
the grantor. (Citing cases) ...... It is elementary 
that there can be but one delivery by the grantor of 
the same deed, for if the first is effectual the second 
cannot be of any avail. It is an invaria:ble rule that 
a valid deed, if once delivered, cannot be defeated by 
any subsequent act unless it be by virtue of some con-
dition contained in the deed itself. 
"The actual test of inrtent of the grantor by his actions 
\Vas not ·whether ~he retained possession of the prop-
erty but whether he retained possession of the deed.'' 
See Anderson v. Mauk, 67 P. 2d 429, Oklahoma. In 
1931, Peter Fisher, the owner of the real estarte involved 
in the action joined in the execution of three deeds cov-
ering different portions of real estate owned by him. The 
deeds had been prepared by Alva D. Mauk. Each of the 
deeds was to a different grantee. On that date, the gran-
tor delivered the deeds to the notary public, Mauk, with 
the following instructions: 
"I am going to give these deeds to you to hold until 
after I and my wife die, and when we have been put 
away, I want you to see that these deeds are given 
to the parties that you made the deeds . . . . . that 
the deeds are made to." 
In January, 1932, Fisher and his wife executed a deed 
to FoiTeSt D. Anderson as the grantee which covered all 
of the property described in the three deeds previously de-
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livered to the notary pUlblic. Fisher died on March 3, 1932. 
The action was by C. D. Mauk as administrator of the es-
tate of Peter Fisher against Anderson and others. '111e 
court held that there was a good delivery. 
See the case of Dieckman v. Jaeger, 170 Pac 727, Ore. 
This is an action of ejectment. In October, 1909, Heney 
Carl Dieckman executed a deed conveying to Emilie Dieck-
man a tract of 160 acres of land. On December 10 of the 
same year he deposited the deed with J. W. Thornton and 
Son in which the ~pertinent part of the instruction is as 
follows: 
"In case of my death, you will please deliver the at-
tached deed from myself to Emilie Dieckman." 
Thereafter, he 1conveyed to other parties a portion of 
said land but not the forty acres involved in this action. 
Grantor died in March, 1912. The court said: 
''It is settled in this jurisdiction that: 'If the grantor 
parts with all dominion and control over the deed, ~ 
serving no right to recall it or alter its provisions, it 
is a good delivery, and the grantee will, upon the death 
of the grantor, succeed to the title.'" 
Another case to the same effect is reported in 
164 P. 2d, 551, Cal. This is an action by Bertha Herman as 
administratrix of the estate of Helen B. Glenn, deceased, 
against Joseph L. Mortenson, individually, and as executor 
of the estate of Virginia R. E. Robertson, aka Virginia R. 
Robertson and as Virginia E. Robertson, deceased, to quiet 
title to land. 
The defendant is the executor of Mrs. Robertson's last 
will and the residuary legatee and devisee and in possession 
of the property and claims ti-tle under the will, subject to 
administration. 
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On July 5th, 1934, Mrs. Robertson requested a law-
yer named Staats to draw a will for her which she exe-
cuted that day, and in this will she devised the property 
in question to Ellen B. Glenn and named her as executrix. 
After making the will, Mrs. Robertson told Staats that she 
also wanted to deed the property to Mrs. Glenn. He ad-
vised her against it and explained the consequences if she 
did that. Mrs. Robertson insisted on having the deed made 
and asked the attorney, Staats, to ~hold it for :her with in-
structions to deliver it to Mrs. Glenn upon Mrs. Robert-
son's death. On February 13, 1941, Mrs. Robertson ex&-
cuted the olographic will, which will was in probate when 
this action was commenced. When Staats learned of Mrs. 
Robertson's death on July 24, 1943, he also learned that 
the grantee 1had died over five years ·before, to-wit: No-
vember 29, 1937. 
The court said, and we quote: ''The rule estaJblished 
by a long line of decisions in this state headed by the pio-
neer case of Bury v. Young, is stated in the recent case of 
Wilkerson v. SeiJb, 20 Cal. 2d, 556, 127 P. 2d 904 as fol-
lows: 'That the grantor's irrevOCaJble delivery of a deed 
to a third person, with instructions that it be given to the 
grantee upon the grantor's death, has the effect of vesting 
the title to the property immediately in the grantee, quali-
fied only by a life tenancy in the grantor, and the deposi-
tary thereby becomes a trustee of the deed for the gran-
tee.' ''. Citing other cases. 
CONCLUSION 
On the record there can be no question but that Willis 
Bates delivered the deed to Thelma Vest Smurthwaite with 
instructions to her to deliver the deed to the defendant if 
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anything happened to the grantor; the term "if anything 
happened" meaning upon the death of tl1e grantor. The 
record is devoid of any evidence that when the deed was 
delivered to the custodian, the grantor made any reserva-
tion of his right to·control the deed and anything the gran-
tor may ~have said eleven or thirteen years thereafter was 
immaterial and could not undo what was done on Janu-
ary 14, 1949, and in fact the grantor made no attempt to 
change, recall or alter the deed. 
The fact that the grantor had possession of the deed 
on two occasions at the instance of the custodian is not 
evidence of non-delivery. To the contrary, the grantor's 
immediate return of the deed to the custodian as early as 
possible indicated that he felt he had made a completed 
gift. 
The fact that the grantor paid the taxes and expenses 
on the property does not prove non-delivery. 
The fact that the custodian states that she would have 
r~ed the deeds is not evidence of non-delivery. In 
othoo words, merely because the custodian misconceived 
her duty is not evidence of non-delivery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, SR., for 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
227 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
DAVE McMULLIN 
20 East Utah Avenue 
Payson, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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